Drawing on a wealth of new evidence from all sides, Triumph Forsaken overturns most of the historical orthodoxy on the Vietnam War. Through the analysis of international perceptions and power, it shows that South Vietnam was a vital interest of the United States. The book provides many new insights into the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 and demonstrates that the coup negated the South Vietnamese government's tremendous, and hitherto unappreciated, military and political gains between 1954 and 1963. After Diem's assassination, President Lyndon Johnson had at his disposal several aggressive policy options that could have enabled South Vietnam to continue the war without a massive US troop infusion, but he ruled out these options because of faulty assumptions and inadequate intelligence, making such an infusion the only means of saving the country.
Detalles
Formato
Tapa suave
Número de Páginas
552
Lenguaje
Inglés
Editorial
Cambridge University Press
Fecha de Publicación
2009-03-02
Dimensiones
9.24" x 6.16" x 1.33" pulgadas
Letra Grande
No
Con Ilustraciones
Si
Temas
Años 1950, Años 1950, Años 1960, Años 1960, Sudeste Asiático, Sudeste Asiático
Acerca del Autor
Moyar, Mark
Dr Mark Moyar is the Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the US Marine Corps University. He holds a B.A. summa cum laude in history from Harvard University and a Ph.D. in history from Cambridge University. A frequent commentator on historical and current events, his articles have appeared in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and many other publications. He is also the author of Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam.
Descripción
Drawing on a wealth of new evidence from all sides, Triumph Forsaken overturns most of the historical orthodoxy on the Vietnam War. Through the analysis of international perceptions and power, it shows that South Vietnam was a vital interest of the United States. The book provides many new insights into the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 and demonstrates that the coup negated the South Vietnamese government's tremendous, and hitherto unappreciated, military and political gains between 1954 and 1963. After Diem's assassination, President Lyndon Johnson had at his disposal several aggressive policy options that could have enabled South Vietnam to continue the war without a massive US troop infusion, but he ruled out these options because of faulty assumptions and inadequate intelligence, making such an infusion the only means of saving the country.
Detalles
Formato
Tapa dura
Número de Páginas
552
Lenguaje
Inglés
Editorial
Cambridge University Press
Fecha de Publicación
2006-08-28
Dimensiones
9.44" x 6.16" x 1.53" pulgadas
Letra Grande
No
Con Ilustraciones
Si
Temas
Años 1950, Años 1950, Años 1960, Años 1960, Sudeste Asiático, Sudeste Asiático
Acerca del Autor
Moyar, Mark
Dr Mark Moyar is the Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the US Marine Corps University. He holds a B.A. summa cum laude in history from Harvard University and a Ph.D. in history from Cambridge University. A frequent commentator on historical and current events, his articles have appeared in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and many other publications. He is also the author of Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam.
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